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Abstract 
Most empirical studies show strong detrimental evidence that regulatory, and administrative, barriers to entry have 
on productivity and on firm growth. In this paper we evaluate and measure the total factor productivity (TFP) 
impacts of having; low quality physical infrastructures (electricity, telecommunications, transport, customs, etc.) 
and bad social infrastructures (rules of law, informality, corruption, etc.). We suggest evaluating the impact on 
average productivity (TFP) and on the allocative efficiency of production among firms based on several versions 
of the Olley and Pakes (O&P) decompositions. We evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each the O&P 
decomposition in terms of their IC explanatory power. Once we have measured those IC impacts, we compare 
them with other sources of empirical information obtained from firm’s perceptions on main bottlenecks for firm 
growth and from doing business reports of the World Bank (2007). For the econometric analysis, we use firm 
level data bases from Turkey’s manufacturing sector based on Investment Climate surveys (ICs) done by the 
World Bank. These ICs are done in many other developing countries and therefore we propose to make cross-
country comparisons based on a new demean concept of TFP that also reduces the heterogeneity if using several 
robust productivity measures within each country. 
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Developing countries are increasingly concern about improving country competitiveness and a 
significant factor for that is to have a good investment climate or business environment. By investment 
climate (IC) we mean: a) the set of location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives 
for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand and b) the institutional, policy and regulatory 
environment in which firms operate. 
 
In this paper we extend the recent econometric methodology developed for the World Bank by 
Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) for the analysis of Investment Climate surveys (ICs) of firms from 
Turkey. Our goal is to use quantitative techniques to estimate the effects on average productivity and 
on allocative efficiency of restrictive business practices coming from a bad investment climate. 
Informality, corruption and bad social institutions are at core of the competitiveness problem in most 
developing countries.  
 
We believe that these types of quantitative analyses are a good complement to the usual empirical 
indicators used for market investigations of competitive problems affecting consumer welfare, see the 
report of the Office of Fair Trading (2004). A basic reference of empirical methods in antitrust 
litigation is Baker and Rubinfeld (1999). Recent and more sophisticated econometric approaches to 
study the behavior of imperfectly competitive markets are discussed in Pakes (2008) but only some of 
these recent techniques are applicable for the analysis of investment climate surveys of developing 
countries given the low quality of the data that create unbalance panels or are just simple cross-section 
data. Aghion and Griffith (2005) discus the weight that policy makers should place on rewarding 
successful innovation through granting monopoly power versus enhancing competitive pressure 
markets puts on firms to push forward the production frontier. 
 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate and measure the impacts on Turkey’s firms of having low 
quality physical infrastructures (electricity, telecommunications, transport, customs, etc.) and of 
having bad social infrastructures (rules of law, informality, corruption, etc.) on: average total factor 
productivity (TFP), on the allocative efficiency of production among firms. Once we have measured 
those impacts, we will compare them with other sources of empirical information like firm’s 
 2 
perceptions on main bottlenecks for firm growth and with the results of the doing business report of 
the World Bank (2006). 
 
Most empirical studies show that productivity (TFP) gains are beneficial for consumers and their 
quantitative impact is contingent of the degree of competition in the market and competition for the 
market, see the reports of the Office of Fair Trading (1999 and 2007). Those reports mention the 
strong detrimental evidence that regulatory and administrative barriers to entry have on productivity. 
As we will see in the empirical results of this paper, this is a key policy issue in Turkey especially for 
the attraction of FDI that would make young and small local firms more productive and efficient.  
 
The results of the doing business report of the World Bank (2006) found that Turkey firms are 
middle rank position (65 out of 178 countries). The weakest areas are related to dealing with licenses, 
employing workers, closing a business, paying taxes (informality) and trading across borders. 
 
The World Bank (2007) report of Turkey found that firm entry and exit rates are higher in Turkey 
than in comparator countries. Entering firms in Turkey are small and go through a vigorous post-entry 
selection process and only 50% of them survive after fours years. Firms that survive do not grow as 
much as firms in other countries. Is this dynamic inefficient allocation of resources due to investment 
climate constraints or is it due to the use of anticompetitive business practices that create institutional 
and physical barriers for firm growth in Turkey?  In this paper we measure those investment climate 
effects on economic performance (TFP, employment, etc.) and on allocative efficiency. 
 
After the past decades with often short-lived economic booms followed by sharp downturns or 
recessions, Turkey’s economic recovery since the 2001 crisis has been notable: Output increased by a 
third and annual inflation fell steadily. Nevertheless, Figure 1a shows that when compared the 
evolution with other middle income countries the evolution of the GDP per capita in Turkey remains 
almost constant with the lowest per capita income. Figure 1b shows that this is due mainly to the 
evolution of labor productivity. Figure 1c illustrates another basic attribute of Turkish economy: the 
ratio of labor force to total population is lower than in the comparator countries what is also translated 
to high unemployment rates.  
The World Bank’s Turkey Investment Climate Assessment (2007) takes stock of the basic 
characteristics of the Turkish economy: low productivity, low capital per worker, low skills and low 
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participation rates in the job market are the main economic challenges that Turkish politicians have to 
face in order to accelerate growth and to use the prosperity of the last years as a springboard which 
may serve to reduce the Turkish GDP gap with respect to more developed economies. 
The lack of convergence in terms of per capita income with respect to U.S and E.U during the last 
twenty-five years shown in Figure 1 reveals the striking weakness of the Turkish economy in terms of 
competitiveness. In particular, out of the total GDP gap between Turkey and European Union 
countries 80% is explained by labor productivity and large differences in output per worker between 
rich and poor countries have been attributed to differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), see 
Caselli (2005), Hall and Jones (1999), and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) among others. Thus, 
once Turkey has secured a reasonable level of macroeconomic stability, in order to get the objectives 
of increasing productivity and reduce unemployment, the main objective of Turkish’s economic 
authorities is seeking ways to stimulate country competitiveness.2 
Our goal is to identify competitive restrictions in terms of the investment climate variables with 
statistically significant and robust effects on several measures of TFP of Turkish firms. For that we 
follow the systematic and robust econometric methodology presented in Escribano and Guasch (2005 
and 2008).3  
However, a deep evaluation of firms’ TFP requires an analysis at the level of individual industries, 
such as textiles, garments, equipment, automotive, steel, banking, or retailing. A reliable measure of 
firm performance at the sector level is their corresponding measure of aggregate productivity
4
 or 
aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). In a seminal paper, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose to 
decompose aggregate country, sector, regional TFP into the average TFP of the establishments or and 
the allocative efficiency term, or sample covariance between TFP and the share of sales.  
                                                 
2
 There is a growing body of literature affirming that large differences on income per capita among countries may be in the 
greatest extent explained by differences in labor productivity, which in turn may be explained by TFP gaps among 
countries. We may decompose output per adult (Y/N) into two components: output per worker (Y/L), and the number of 
workers relative to the adult population (L/N), Y/N=(Y/L)*(L/N). Under a Cobb–Douglas production function framework 
with constant returns to scale, differences in labor productivity between country A and country B are due to differences in 
the capital to labor ratio and TFP differences. 
3
 The work presented here has been used as background paper for the comprehensive analysis of the Turkish investment 
climate assessment; see World Bank (2007). 
4
 The aggregate TFP of a given sector is computed as simply the weighted average of the TFP at the firm level, where the 
weights are firms’ share of sales. 
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For Turkish’s manufacturing firms the Olley and Pakes (O&P) decomposition of TFP based on the 
restricted Solow’s residual is presented in Figure 2.1 by industry, in Figure 2.2 by region, in Figure 2.3 
by size and age of the firm and in Figure 2.4 by year. The first two figures reveal great heterogeneity 
by industry and by region. Average TFP term varies enormously sector by sector and their 
corresponding allocative efficiency term reveals that the electrical machinery sector inefficiently 
reallocates resources –output is going from more productive to less productive firms– since this term is 
negative. However, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show a large homogeneity by age and through time.  
The natural question that arises now is: what are the causes of the large TFP differences observed, 
across industries within the same country and second across different countries? Investigation on this 
question has largely focused on differences in technology within representative firms (or average TFP 
differences). These are models of within-firm inefficiency, with the inefficiency varying across 
countries, see for example Howitt (2000), Keller (2004), Parente and Prescott (2000) and Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2005).  
Nevertheless, the more recent literature on productivity dynamics has documented a high 
dispersion of productivities within industries, providing a considerable margin for reallocation of 
resources among heterogeneous establishments. Thus, the misallocation of resources among firms can 
potentially have important effects on aggregate TFP, for instance Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) 
document that about half of overall productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing in the 80’s can be 
attributed to factor reallocation from low productivity to high productivity plants. Within this recent 
body of literature the working hypotheses is that not only the level of productivity among 
heterogeneous plants what matters, but also how the resources are allocated among heterogeneous 
plants even within narrowly defined industries, see Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004), 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006), Olley and Pakes (1996), Alfaro et al. (2007), Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2006) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2007)) 
among others. 
In a frictionless economy the allocative efficiency term of the O&P decomposition should be equal 
to zero, since the natural development of markets makes the more productive establishments to gain 
market share from the less successful ones; nonetheless, the existence of frictions in the markets may 
prevent resources to be naturally reallocated among establishments. These frictions may arise from a 
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variety of causes; a non-exhaustive list may include adjustment costs of entry and exit, market 
structures or technological factors among others. However, these frictions can also be driven by 
government policies and institutions that affect market competition through their impact on costs, risks 
and barriers to competition. While these factors are hardly resolved in developed countries, they 
assume an even more important role in emerging and transition economies like Turkey, where they 
make the cost of doing business inefficiently high. These factors include corruption, taxes, the 
regulatory burden and extent of red tape in general, regulation of factor markets (labor, intermediate 
materials and capital), the quality of infrastructure, technological and innovation support, and the 
availability and cost of finance. All these factors deteriorate the investment climate for doing business 
and affect the performance of private firms, reducing the overall efficiency of the firms in a given 
country (average TFP) and decelerating the allocative efficiency process.
5
 
A significant component of country competitiveness is therefore having a good investment climate 
or business environment. The investment climate, as defined in the WDR (2005), is “the set of 
location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, 
create jobs and expand.” It is now well accepted and documented, conceptually and empirically, that 
the scope and nature of regulations on economic activity and factor markets - the so-called investment 
climate and business environment - can significantly and adversely impact productivity, growth and 
economic activity (Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Loayza, Oviedo and 
Serven, 2004; McMillan, 1998 and 2004; OECD, 2001; Wilkinson, 2001; Alexander et al., 2004; 
Djankov et al., 2002; Haltiwanger, 2002; He et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003; and World Bank, 2004 
a,b).  
Prescott (1998) argues that to understand large international income differences, it is necessary to 
explain differences in productivity (TFP). His main candidate to explain those gaps is the resistance to 
the adoption of new technologies and to the efficient use of current operating technologies, which in 
                                                 
5
 For example, Kasper (2002) shows that poorly understood “state paternalism” has usually created unjustified barriers to 
entrepreneurial activity, resulting in poor growth and a stifling environment. Kerr(2002) shows that a quagmire of 
regulation, which is all too common, is a massive deterrent to investment and economic growth. As a case in point, 
McMillan (1988) argues that obtrusive government regulation before 1984 was the key issue in New Zealand’s slide in the 
world per-capita income rankings. Hernando de Soto (2002) describes one key adverse effect of significant business 
regulation and weak property rights: with costly firm regulations, fewer firms choose to register and more become 
informal. Also, if there are high transaction costs involved in registering property, assets are less likely to be officially 
recorded, and therefore cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans, thereby becoming “dead” capital. Likewise, Erosa and 
Cabrillana (2007) point out that the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different 
productivities, and across industries with different needs for external financing 
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turn are conditioned by the institutional and policy arrangements a society employs (investment 
climate variables for us). Cole et al. (2004) also have argued that Latin America has not replicated 
Western economic success due to the productivity (TFP) gap. They point to competitive barriers 
(investment climate constraints for us) as the promising channels for understanding the low 
productivity observed in Latin American countries.  
We show that all those institutional factors worsening the investment climate dramatically reduce 
the competitive conditions and harm the average productivity and the allocative efficiency process in 
Turkey. In addition, these results are fully consistent with managers’ perceptions, signaling that among 
all the investment climate factors those regarding red tape, informalities, taxes and corruption play a 
key role in the determination of the aggregate productivity. 
The structure of the paper is the following; Section 2 presents the information on the IC survey of 
Turkey, the econometric models for robust TFP estimation and the new concept of demean 
productivity that will be useful for cross-country comparisons. Section 3, introduces several O&P 
types’ decompositions for TFP and logTFP. Section 4, presents the main empirical results and makes 
an international comparison. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2 Econometric methods 
The econometric methodology used in this paper to compute the effect of the investment climate 
on TFP follows Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). We concentrate here on several extensions 
evaluating the impact of IC and average TFP and on allocative efficiency and their corresponding 
cross-country comparisons.  
2.1 The Data 
The pursuit of greater competitiveness and a better investment climate is leading countries -often 
assisted by multilaterals such as the World Bank- to undertake their own studies, to set priorities for 
intervention and reform. The most common instrument used has been firm-level surveys, know as 
Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) from which both subjective evaluations of obstacles and objective 
hard-data numbers with direct links to costs and pr
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The Investment Climate Surveys capture firms’ experience in a range of areas related with the 
economic performance: financing, governance, corruption, crime, regulation, tax policy, labor 
relations, conflict resolution, infrastructures, supplies and marketing, quality, technology, and training 
among others. For that purpose, we classify investment climate factors in five categories to evaluate 
the impact of each group on the economic performance. In the first group, says infrastructures, we 
include all the variables related with customs clearance, power and water supply, telecommunications 
(including phone connection and information technologies) and transportation. In the second group, 
red tape, corruption and crime, are included all the IC factors regarding tax rates, conflicts resolution, 
crime, bureaucracy, informalities, corruption and regulations. The next group is finance and corporate 
governance which contains factors related with governance, investments, informalities in payments of 
sales and purchases, access and cost of finance and accountability (or auditing). The last group of IC 
variables is quality, innovation and labor skills; this group includes the quality certifications, 
technology usage, product and process innovation, research and development, quality of the labor, 
training and managers’ experience and education. The last group –other control variables– is not 
properly a group of investment climate factors but a group of other firms’ control characteristics, we 
classify into this group all the factors that we consider may have an important impact on the economic 
performance but not considered as IC factor: exports and imports, age, FDI, number of competitors, 
size of the firm, etc.  
The ICs provides information on the productivity (or production function) variables, says, output 
(sales), employment, intermediate materials, capital stock and labor cost. The ICs does not provide 
information on prices at the firm level, so the production function variables were deflated by using the 
World Bank’s country specific Consumer Price Index, base 2000. An appendix with the definition of 
the variables used is included at the end of the paper. 
The data are from a survey of 1323 manufacturing establishments conducted in the summer of 
2005. The panel is short in the time dimension, since includes only 2 years of productivity data, and 
has 1 year of investment climate (IC) variables. The cleaned dataset leaves a panel with 836 
observations for each of the two years.  
In this paper we focus on the manufacturing sector and by classifying the establishments by their 
ISIC code we end up with establishments from the next eight sectors: a) Food and beverages; b) 
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Textiles and apparels; c) Chemicals; d) Non-metallic mineral products; e) Metallic products; f) 
Machinery and equipment; g) Electrical machinery; h) Transport equipment. 
 
2. 2 Alternative Productivity Measures of the Impacts of IC Variables 
Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) model relates infrastructure and other IC and C variables with 
firm-level productivity (TFP) according to the following observable fixed-effects system of equations: 
 log log log log log
it L it M it K it it
Y L M K Pα α α= + + +                                      (2.1a) 
,
log
j it P iti Ds j DT tP wa D D αα α= + + + +′ ′                                                    (2.1b)  
, ,i iIC P i C P ia IC C εα α= + +′ ′                                                              (2.1c) 
where, Y is firms’ output (sales), L is employment, M denotes intermediate materials, K is the capital 
stock, INF is a time-fixed vector of observable infrastructure variables, IC and C are time-fixed effect 
vectors of other investment climate and control time-fixed effects, and Dj and Dt are the vectors of 
industry and year dummies.  
The usually unobserved time fixed effects ( ia ) of the TFP equation (2.1b) is here proxy by the set 
of observed time fixed components IC and C variables of (2.1c) and a remaining unobserved random 
effects ( iε ). The two random error terms of the system, iε  and itw , are assumed to be conditionally 
uncorrelated with the explanatory L, M, K, IC and C variables6 of equation (2.2), 
, ,log log log logit L it M it K it P itj tP i P i Ds DTIC CY L M K uIC C D Dα α α αα α α α= + + + + + + +′ ′ ′ ′+ .              (2.2) 
Therefore, the regression equation (2.2) is representing the conditional expectation plus a 
composite random-effect error term equal to it i itu vε= +  that should satisfy standard assumptions of 
random effects (RE) conditional models. That is; 
                                                 
6 Under this formulation (and other standard conditions) the OLS estimator of the productivity equation (2.2) 
with robust standard errors is consistent, although a more efficient estimator (GLS) is given by the random 
effects (RE) estimator that takes into consideration the particular covariance structure of the error term, 
i itwε + , 
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2
, ,log log log ,/ , , , , ,it it iti P i P i j tL M Kand Var IC C D D εε σ  =  .  
 
Notice that we need to condition on the observable fixed effects (IC) to get the orthogonally 
condition of the inputs L, M and K. 
 
Providing reliable and robust estimates of the impact of IC on productivity are not a 
straightforward task. First, because the functional form of the PF is not observed, and there is no 
available single salient TFP measure. Second, there is an identification issue separating TFP from PF; 
when any PF inputs is influenced by unobserved common causes affecting productivity—such as a 
firm’s fixed effects—there is a simultaneous equation problem in equation (2.1a). Third, we could 
expect that several IC variables have at least some degree of endogeneity, questioning therefore the 
conditional uncorrelation condition of (2.2). In what follows of this section, we briefly review the 
solutions to these questions suggested in Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). 
Productivity (TFP), or multifactor productivity, refers to the effects of any variable different from 
the inputs—labor (L), intermediate materials (M), and capital (K)—affecting the production (Y) 
process. Since there is no single salient measure of productivity (or logPi), any empirical evaluation of 
the productivity impact of IC might critically depend on the particular productivity measure used. 
Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) suggested -following the literature on sensitivity analysis see for 
example Magnus and Vasnew (2006)- to look for empirical results (elasticities) that are robust to 
several productivity measures. This is also the approach we follow in this paper. 
In particular, we want the elasticities of IC on productivity (TFP) to be robust (with equal signs 
and similar magnitudes) for the 10 different productivity measures used. The alternative productivity 
measures used come from considering: 
(a) Different functional forms of the production functions (Cobb-Douglas and Translog) 
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(b) Different sets of assumptions (technology and market conditions) to get consistent estimators 
based on Solow’s residuals, ordinary least squares (OLS), or random effects (RE), and so on 
(c) Different levels of aggregation in measuring input-output elasticities (at the industry level or at 
the aggregate country level). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the productivity measures used for the IC evaluation. The two-step 
estimation starts from the nonparametric approach based on cost shares from Hall (1990) to obtain 
Solow’s residuals in logs under two different assumptions:
7
 (a) the cost shares are constant for all 
plants located in the same country (restricted Solow residual), and (v) the cost shares vary among 
industries in the same country (unrestricted by industry Solow residual). Once we have estimated the 
Solow residuals (logPi) in the first step, in the second step we can estimate equation (2.3) by pooling 
OLS with robust standard errors. We also estimate (2.3) by RE to obtain the corresponding IC 
elasticities and semi-elasticities, 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of productivity measures and estimated investment climate (IC) elasticities 
1. Solow´s Residual 
Two-step 
Estimation 
1.1 Restricted coefficient 





2 (Pit) measures 




2.1 Restricted coefficient 





4 (Pit) measures 




3.1 Restricted coefficient 





4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
Total 
   
 
10 (Pit) measures 
12 (IC) elasticities 
Source: authors estimations 
Note: Restricted coefficient = equal input-output elasticities in all industries. 
Unrestricted coefficient = different input output elasticities by industry. 
                                                 
7 The advantage of the Solow residuals is that they require neither the inputs (L, M, K) to be exogenous nor the input-output elasticities 
to be constant or homogeneous (Escribano and Guasch, 2005 and 2008). The drawback is that they require having constant returns to 
scale (CRS) and, at least, competitive input markets. 
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, ,log it IC P i C P i Ds j DT t P i itP IC C D D wα εα α α α= + + + +′ ′ ′ ′ + +                                    (2.3a) 
 
where IC and C are, respectively, the observable fixed effects vectors of investment climate and 
control variables listed in Table A.2 of the Appendix. In all the panel data regressions, we always 
control for several sector-industry dummies (Dj, j = 1, 2, ..., qD), and in the cases having more than one 
year of observations we also include a set of time (Dt, t = 1, 2,..., qT) dummy variables and always a 
constant term (αP).  
For cross-country comparisons based on TFP we use the following demean TFP8 concept that gets 
rid of the constant term as well as the constant effects by industry and by year, concentrating therefore 
on the part of TFP that is influenced by IC and the other plant level control C variables, 
 
, ,log it P i P iIC CDemean P IC Cα α= +′ ′ .                                                   (2.3b) 
 
In the single-step estimation approach, we consider the parametric estimation by OLS and RE of 
the extended production function (2.2). To address the well-known problem of the endogeneity of 
inputs (L, M, and K) , we follow the approach proposed by Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). That 
is, we proxy the usually unobserved firm-specific fixed effects (which are the main cause of inputs’ 
endogeneity) by a long list of observed firm-specific fixed effects coming from the investment climate 
surveys. Controlling for the largest set of IC variables and plant C characteristics, we can get—under 
standard regularity conditions—consistent and unbiased least squares estimators of the parameters of 
the PF and the IC elasticities. Furthermore, we use two different functional forms of the PF—Cobb-
Douglas and Translog—under two different assumptions on the input-output elasticities: equal input-
                                                 
8
 Notice that the demean TFP concept of equation (2.3b) corresponds to the observable part of the time fixed effects 
equation (2.1c). 
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output elasticities in all industries (restricted case) and different input-output elasticities by industries 
(unrestricted case). 
Another econometric problem we have to face when estimating the parameters of the IC and C 
variables—either from the two-step or single-step procedure—is the possible endogeneity of some of 
these IC variables. That is, many IC variables are likely to be determined simultaneously along with 
any TFP measure. With these productivity equations, the traditional instrumental variable (IV) 
approach is difficult to implement, given that we only have information for one year, and therefore we 
cannot use the natural instruments for inputs, such as those provided by their own lags or it is difficult 
to find good instruments from the list of IC variables. As a simple alternative correction for the 
endogeneity of the IC variables, we use the region-industry-size average of firm-plant-level IC 
variables instead of the crude IC variables,
9
 which is a common solution in panel data studies at the 
firm level10 (see, for instance, Veeramani and Goldar, 2004, for the use of the industry-region averages 
with IC variables). 
Using industry-region-size averages also mitigates the effect of having certain missing individual 
IC observations at the plant level, which—as mentioned in Section 3—represent one of the most 
important difficulties using ICs. As an alternative, we also follow a second strategy to deal with the 
missing values of some IC, and C variables. In order to keep as many observations in the regressions 
as possible to avoid losing efficiency, when the response rate of the variables is large enough, we 
decided to replace those missing observations with the corresponding industry-region-size average.11 
Thus, we gain observations, efficiency, and representativity at the cost of introducing measurement 
errors into some variables.
12
 
The econometric methodology applied for the selection of the variables (IC, and C) goes from the 
general to the specific. The otherwise omitted variables problem that we encounter—starting from a 
                                                 
9
 Because of the low number of available regions in most of the countries, we had to use the industry-region-size variables 
instead of the region-industry averages. For the creation of cells a minimum number of firms are imposed—there must be 
at least 15 to 20 firms in each industry-region-size cell to create the average, otherwise we apply the region-industry 
averages. If the problem persists, we apply the industry-size or the region-size average.  
10
 This two-step estimation approach is a simplified version of an instrumental variable estimator (two-stage least squares, 
2SLS). 
11
 Notice that this replacement strategy has a straightforward weighted least squares interpretation since we are giving a 
greater weight to those observations with more variance. 
12
 The measurement error introduces a downward bias in the parameters that depends on the ratio between the variances of 
the variables and the measurement error. Since those explanatory variables are constant within regions, sizes, and 
industries we expect their variances will be small. 
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too-simple model—generates biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We start the selection of 
variables with a wide set compounded by up to 95 IC variables, see Table A.2 of the appendix . We 
avoid simultaneously using time variables that provide the same information and are likely to be 
correlated, mitigating the problem of multicollinearity that could otherwise arise. We then start 
removing from the regressions—the less significant variables—one by one, until we obtain the final 
set of variables, all significant in at least one of the regressions and with parameters varying within a 
reasonable range of values. Once we have selected a preliminary model we test for omitted IC 
variables. 
The robust coefficients of the IC, and C variables in productivity, along with their level of 
significance, are detailed in Table C.1 of the country-specific annexes included at the end of the report. 
Indications on the form the variables are entering the regression—industry-region-size average or 
missing values replaced by the industry-region-size average—are also included. 
Table B.1 of the appendix shows the correlation matrix between all the possible pair wise 
combinations of productivity measures. The correlations range from very high and positive values 
(0.99) to very low and negative values (-0.001). However, the IC estimated elasticities on the 10 
alternative (see Table 2.1) productivity measures given in Tables C.1a and Table C.1b of the appendix, 
show very robust results. All the IC elasticities and semi-elasticities estimated never change the signs 
and the numerical values obtained are reasonable. The main reason for getting these robust results is 
obtained by controlling for IC variables from all the IC blocks (Infrastructures, Red tape, corruption 
and crime, Finance and corporate governance, Quality, innovation and labor skills and the other 
Control variables) to avoid having omitted variables biases, see Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). 
 
 
3 The Olley and Pakes decompositions: IC Productivity contributions to the 
sample mean and to allocative efficiency 
 
To complement the productivity analysis based on regression techniques we perform the allocation 
efficiency decomposition of Olley and Pakes (1996). This analysis is especially interesting when the 
number of firms in some sectors have small number of observations on IC variables or to do country 
by country analysis when we were forced to pool observations from different countries to be able to do 
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regression analysis. In those cases, we cannot give much credibility to the country by country, or 
sector by sector, regression estimates of the impact of IC variables on productivity since they are based 
on very small samples. Furthermore, this decomposition provides additional information on aggregate 
productivity and efficiency allocation analysis within each country or sector. 
 
The Olley and Pakes (1996) type TFP decomposition, (O&P) from now on, has two elements; the 
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= ∑ be the aggregate (or weighted) productivity of industry j at time t obtained as 
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the sample average productivity of the firms of sector j in year t. Then the annual aggregate 
productivity of industry j can be decomposed where
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The first term (











∑ %% ) = Njt ,,ˆcov( , )Y j tj ts P , measures the allocative efficiency or covariance between the share of 
sales and productivity, ,,ˆcov( , )
Y
j tj ts P ,  multiplied by the number of firms, Njt, that belong to sector j in 
year t. If the covariance is positive, then the larger it is the covariance, the higher will be the share of 
sales that goes to more productive firms. Therefore, allocation efficiency is increased and sector j 
aggregate productivity is enhanced. However, if the covariance is negative, there are allocation 
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= in the Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition. 
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inefficiencies since the more negative the covariance is, the higher will be the share of output that goes 
to less productive firms, reducing aggregate sector j productivity.  
 











= ∑ be the aggregate log productivity of industry j at time t obtained as the weighted 
average of i-plant log productivity in sector j at year t, where Njt is the number of firms in sector j 
where j = 1, ... ,8. The weights ( ,
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= ∑ be the sample average log productivity of the firms of sector j in year t. Then the 
annual aggregate log productivity of industry j can be decomposed as in (3.1) where 
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∑ %% )=Njt , , ,ˆcov( , log )Y j t j ts P , measures the allocative efficiency between variables.  
 
For each aggregation level, we construct a measure of aggregate productivity and we apply the 
alternative Olley and Pakes (O&P) decompositions. The particular productivity measure that we select 
is not important if the empirical results are robust for all the measures. In particular, we apply the 
Olley and Pakes productivity decompositions (3.1)-(3.2) to the Solow residuals, at five different levels 
of aggregation; aggregate level, by sector, by region, by size of the firms, by age of the firms, etc. 
 
Figures 2.1 to 2.5 report the results of the O&P decomposition in levels at industry, region, size 
and age, year and city aggregation levels. By industry “Textiles & apparels” has the largest aggregate 
productivity followed by “Food and beverages”. Efficiency term becomes more relevant in “Non-
metallic mineral products”, whereas in “Transport equipment” and “Machinery & equipment” its role 
is marginal. By regions Ic Anadolu is the more productive region, having the efficiency term a key 
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role. By size, the small and large have similar aggregate productivity, however the efficiency term is 
less important in large firms, whereas this term is almost a half of aggregate productivity of small 
firms. There are no significant differences among age and years. By cities we found the largest 
aggregate productivity in Erzurum, Konya and Kahramanmaras. 
 






3.1 IC variables assessment based on Olley and Pakes decompositions 
 
Aggregate log-productivity, say (log P), is equal to the sum of the sample average log productivity 
of the establishments, and the covariance between the share of sales (sY) and log productivity. The 
index q could also indicate a particular industry, region, size, and so on. The useful additive property 
of equation (2.2) in logarithms, allow us to obtain an exact closed form solution of the decomposition 
of aggregate log productivity according to equation (3.3). We can express aggregate log productivity 
as a weighted sum of the average values of the IC, C, dummy D variables, the intercept and the 
productivity average residuals ( uˆ ) from (2.2); and, the sum of the covariances between the share of 
sales and investment climate variables IC, C, dummies D and the productivity residuals ( uˆ ). 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog ´ ´ ´ ´ cov( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ´ cov( , ) ´ cov( , ) ´ cov( , ) cov( , )
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IC P C P Ds p t jt IC t P
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jt C t P jt Ds t j jt DT t t t t t
u
u
P IC C D s IC
s C s D s D s
N
N N N N
αα α α α
α α α
+ + += + + +
+ + +
       (3.3) 
where the set of estimated parameters used comes from the two-step TFP estimation, having the 
restricted Solow’s  residual as dependent variable in (2.2).  
From equation (3.3) each IC, and C variable may affect the aggregate log productivity through 
both its average and covariance (with respect to the share of sales). This complements the information 
provided by the marginal effects (IC elasticities). Suppose that an IC variable with a low impact, in 
terms of marginal effects (elasticities), affect most of the firms in a given country, then the impact of 
such a IC variable in terms of average productivity could be very high. Therefore, it is very important 
for policy analysis to combine the empirical evidence from the estimated IC elasticities, on 
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productivity, with their corresponding IC impact on the two components of O&P decompositions; 
average productivity and allocative efficiency. 
A variable with a negative marginal effect on average productivity (or log P) may have either a 
positive or a negative effect on allocative efficiency. If the covariance of that IC variable and the 
market share is positive, then the greater proportion of sales is in the hands of establishments with high 
levels of that variable the larger will be the negative impact on aggregate productivity, therefore 
decreasing the allocative efficiency. In contrast, a negative covariance means that those establishments 
with the highest levels of the IC variable have the lowest market shares, and, therefore, the negative 
effect of the IC variable on average productivity is somehow compensated through the effect on the 
reallocation of resources among firms.  
By operating in (3.3) obtain the next expression that allows us obtain a direct decomposition of the 
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+
                        (3.4) 
There are several advantages of using equation (3.4). First, we can compare net contributions by 
isolating the impact of INF and other IC variables from the impact of industry dummies, the intercept, 
and the residuals. Second, we can express what portion of aggregate productivity is explained by IC, 
and C variables (demean logTFP), and what proportion is due to the constant term, industry dummies 
and so on. To make cross-country comparisons based on IC impacts on TFP, to avoid the problem of 
comparing apples and oranges, it is desirable create an index (demean TFP). After subtracting the 
mean (that is, the constant term, time effects, industry effects and country-specific effects) from 
aggregate productivity we can concentrate on the contributions of IC variables to the demean TFP.  
Similarly, we can construct the demeaned counterparts of expressions (3.3) and (3.4) and compute the 
percentage contribution of each IC variable or by blocks of IC variables -see equations (3.5) and (3.6) 
respectively- obtaining the following demean mixed O&P decomposition, 
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IC P C P INF i P i IC i P i C i P i
IC C cov s INF cov s IC cov s C
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N N Nα α α α α+= ++ +                    
(3.6) 
 
So far, we have exploited the linear properties of the logarithm form of the mixed O&P 
decomposition of TFP. However, the original O&P decomposition is based on TFP and the share of 
sales (in levels) and therefore is capturing also nonlinear relations between market shares and IC 
variables coming from (2.3a). To know to what extent these nonlinear terms are affecting this relation, 
we perform simulation experiments
14
 on IC and C variables, and evaluate the consistency of the results 
with the ones obtained from the previous mixed O&P decomposition- see (2.4b). The IC simulations 
are done variable by variable (one at a time) keeping the rest of the variables constant; that is, we 
propose a scenario in which one of the IC variables experiment a 20 percent improvement in all 
establishments. We compute the corresponding rate of change of aggregate productivity, average 
productivity and allocative efficiency caused by such a 20% improvement. We repeat the same 
experiment for the rest IC and C variables, and, for comparative purposes, we also evaluate the relative 
by group of IC variables. 
 
3.2 Aggregate Productivity Decomposition in Logs in Terms of IC variables and an 
Alternative Input Decomposition 
 
Consider the O&P decomposition of aggregate productivity of sector j based on variables in logs, 
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In general, the original O&P decomposition (3.1) has several advantages over (3.3) in terms of 
explanatory power of the investment climate (IC) variables because we are interested in TFP and not 
on log TFP. However, there is one important algebraic simplification when we using (3.3) that allow 
us to obtain an exact decomposition of the IC effects in term of the inputs (L, M and K) of the 
production function that serves as a measure of the degree of endogeneity of the inputs.  
 
Writing the Solow´s residuals from equation (2.2), or the productivity term of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (2.1a), with variables in deviation to their means we have, 
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= = + −∑ ∑ . That is, the aggregate log productivity of the sector-industry j, is given by the sum 
of two components; average log productivity and Njt times the sample variance of log productivity of the firms of sector j. 
16
 The estimation of the input-output elasticities, αL, αM and αK can be obtained from equation (1) or from their 
corresponding cost shares, see equation (3). 
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So far we have derived an expression of the covariance term of the O&P decomposition in logs as 
a weighted sum of the covariances of each input (logL, logM and logK), with log-productivity plus a 
constant proportion term of the sample variance of log-productivity. However, we are interested on 
reaching an expression of the covariance term in terms of IC and control (C, D) variables. To do that 
we express the estimated productivity equation (2.3a) in deviations to the mean, this leads to 
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For simplicity in the notation we now replace that ICi, Ci Dj and Dt by ICi, Ci, Dj and Dt 
representing scalars instead of vectors; hence we would be handling only one IC, C, Dj and Dt 
variables. Substituting (3.10) in the O&P efficiency term of equation (3.3) we get a decomposition of 
the allocative efficiency component in terms of IC variables, control (C) variables, sector dummies 
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Substituting (3.11) in (3.7) and taking into account that   
 
,, , ,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
j itj it IC j i C j i Ds j DT t P uP IC C D D αα α α α= + + + + +                                         (3.12) 
and therefore 
,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
j itjt IC j C j Ds j DT t P uP IC C D D αα α α α= + + + + +                                               (3.13) 
 
and being log log
, , , , ,
1
cˆov( , ) ( )
jt
Y Y
j t j t j it
N
j it j t
i
s J s J J
=






, , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆcov( , ) cov( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ       cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , )
j t
Y Y
j t IC j C j Ds j DT t P IC j t j C j t j
Y Y Y
Ds j t j DT j t T j t j t
uP IC C D D s IC s C
s D s D s u
αα α α α α α
α α
+ + + +′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + +
′ ′+ + +
+
        (3.14) 











ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ cov( , )ˆ
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆcov( , ) cov( , ) cov(
  100 100
j t
Y
IC jt j t jIC j C j Ds j DT t P
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
Y Y Y
C jt j t j Ds jt j t j DT jt j t
jt jt
u N s ICIC C D D
P P P P P P P
N s C N s D N s
P P
α αα α α α
α α α
+ + + +







ˆ ˆ, ) cov( , )
100 100
Y
T jt j it j t
jt jt






A similar expression could be obtain in terms of the ratio of covariances.17  
Let R be a input where R=L, M, K, substituting the expression for log-productivity of equation 
(3.13) in (3.10) we have the next general decomposition for each input R in terms of IC, C and D 
variables and the residual term 
,
ˆ
j itu  is given by, 
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Substituting (3.16) in equation (3.11), we get an equivalent expression of equation (3.14) which is 
an O&P type decomposition,  
 
                                                 
17 Notice that it is interesting to express (3.9) as 
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where the ratio of the sample covariance of each input and log productivity to the efficiency term can easily be estimated as 
the slope coefficient of three simple instrumental variable (IV) regressions using log productivity as the instrument; a) the 
logYj,it on a constant and logLj,it, b) the logYj,it on a constant and logMj,it and the logYj,it on a constant and logKj,it. Finally, 
the last term of equation (17) is similarly obtained as the slope coefficient of the IV estimation of the simple regression of 
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The empirical results of equations (3.15) and (3.17) relating the IC variables with inputs are 
reported in Table C2.b. 
 
 
3.2 Simulation impacts: Changes of IC variables on the O&P decomposition of TFP in levels 
 
Our aim now is to get a measure of the impact of a 20% improvements in the IC and C variables 
on the aggregate productivity in levels, to do that we start from the next O&P decomposition of the 
aggregate productivity measured by the restricted Solow residual in levels at moment cero (0) prior to 
the improvement in one of the IC variables. 
Let the O&P decomposition in levels (see equation (3.1)) at moment 0 prior to the change in the 
IC variable and let ICi, Ci, Dj and Dt represent scalars instead of vectors for simplicity 
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with           
1 1 0 0 0
, , , ,exp( )j it IC j i C j i Ds i DT t P j itP IC C D D uα α α α α= + + + + +                      (3.19) 
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4   IC Estimated Elasticities and Semi-Elasticities on Productivity 
 
The econometric analysis based on the 10 different productivity (P) measures is explained in the 
rest of this section. But, before discussing the effects of different IC variables on productivity, it is 
important to take into account that the economic interpretation of each investment climate coefficient 
is contingent on the units of measurement of each IC variable and on the transformations performed on 
them (logs, fractions, percentages, qualitative constructions, etc.). Since productivity measures are 
always in logs, when the IC variable is expressed in log terms, the estimated coefficient is the constant 
productivity-IC elasticity; and when the IC variable is not expressed in log form, the estimated 
coefficient is generally described as a productivity-IC semi-elasticity18. While the constant 
productivity-IC elasticity measures the percentage change in productivity induced by a percentage 
change in the IC variable, the semi-elasticity coefficient multiplied by 100, measures the percentage 
change in productivity induced by a unitary change in the IC variable. Notice that within each group, 
most of the IC variables of Tables C.1a and C.1b have the expected signs and the estimated elasticities 
or semi-elasticities are within a reasonable range of values for the 10 productivity measures 
                                                 
18
 While it is sometimes natural to express an IC variable in log form, for some types of IC variables it is more 
appropriate not to do so. For example, if IC variables are fractions or percentage numbers with some data equal to 0. 
However, expressing IC variables in fractions allow us to approximate their coefficients as constant elasticities and 
not as semi-elasticities. 
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considered. The empirical results are robust since the signs of all of the ICA variables are equal and 
the range of values of the elasticities is reasonable. 
 
4.1 IC-Evaluation on the O&P Decomposition 
 
In section 3 by following Olley and Pakes (1996) we have decomposed aggregate productivity 
both in levels and mixed decomposition into two terms, average productivity and allocative efficiency 
(or covariance) term. In this section our aim is to deal in depth with these decompositions and go one 
step beyond so that we are able to evaluate the impact of each IC and control (C, D) variables on 
average productivity, on the efficiency (covariance) term and as a result on aggregate productivity. To 
do that, we propose a mixed decomposition of productivity. In addition, we also evaluate the effect of 
IC and C variables on productivity by simulating changes in those variables. 
 
The absolute percentage contributions given so far were based in groups of IC variables, so we 
cannot say much about the impact of the individual IC factors. For the case of Turkey, Figures 4.2-4.4 
breaks down the absolute percentage impact of Figure 4.1 by key IC variables. 
 
The largest contributions to the average TFP and allocative efficiency come from the red tape, 
corruption and crime variables: sales declared to taxes and losses due to criminal activity in the case of 
the average TFP and dummy for lawsuit and sales declared to taxes for the case of the allocative 
efficiency. 
4.3 International comparisons of TFP 
From the demeaned productivity at the firm level we can obtain the O&P decomposition either in 
levels or in logs (mixed), and this new set of country by country comparable results are presented in 
Figures 9 and 10. Panel A, Figure 10 shows the decomposition of the demean productivity in levels; it 
is interpreted as the productivity that comes from the investment climate conditions. The results are 
not surprising at all since they are basically consistent with the ones provided by the per capita income 
and by the 2007 Doing Business Report; the ranking based on the demean productivity is leaded by 
Chile followed at a lower level by Brazil and Mexico. At the end of the ranking are the countries with 
 25 
the most anti-productive investment climate, or in other words the countries for which the investment 
climate conditions poses more difficulties to the economic development; these countries are India and 
Turkey. Symmetrically, as for the regular O&P decomposition, the contribution of the investment 
climate to the aggregate demean productivity is decomposed into the contribution to the average 
demean productivity and the contribution to the allocative demean efficiency term, the effect of the 
allocative efficiency is always lower than the effect of the average productivity. 
Alternatively, this demean productivity may be also interpreted as a sum of pro-productive and 
anti-productive IC variables, examples of pro-productive IC factors are the use of the e-mail or the 
labor skills, negative or anti-productive factors are the number of inspections, the informal competition 
etc. As a consequence the productivity will decrease as the importance of the anti-productive factors 
becomes larger and larger; this picture becomes even clearer in the panel B of the Figure 10. The 
demean O&P decomposition in logs of the panel B shows how the aggregate productivity may be 
negative—Turkey—when the negative aspects of the investment climate gain importance, or positive 
when the pro-productive IC factors weight more than the negative ones, which is the case of Chile, 
Brazil, Mexico and India. 
So far we know that the investment climate as a whole has an effect on the aggregate productivity 
of the manufacturing industry, and also that this effect may be positive or negative depending on 
which IC aspects matter more, the pro-productive or the anti-productive. The aim now is to know at 
what extent this decreases or increases of the productivity are due to the infrastructures, the red tape, 
corruption and crime or to other IC groups. Panels B of Figures 9 and 10 provides the demean 
decomposition by groups of IC and C variables. Notice that the demean decomposition in levels lacks 
the additive properties of the decomposition in logs and therefore to decompose the demean 
productivity in levels we use simulations of improvements of the IC variables. Panel B of Figure 9 
shows the results obtained for the simulations, the interpretation of these results is straightforward, if 
all the IC factors would improve by a 20% (this implies decreases in the negative factors and vice 
versa in the positive ones) one by one—a 20% more firms using e-mail, a 20% less inspections, etc—
the aggregate productivity could increase in Turkey by 55%, in India by 120% and so on. From Figure 
9, panel B it is clear that there are some economies more likely to be affected by the investment 
climate and therefore are more sensitive to changes in the IC conditions, this is the case of Turkey and 
Mexico, the opposite case are India and Brazil. Lastly, the improvements of the aggregate productivity 
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come in almost all the countries via improvements in the average productivity and in a lower extent by 
improvements in the allocative efficiency, with the exception of Chile. 
The simulations are interpreted as a dynamic change from the initial situation to the simulated 
scenario, at this respect panel B of the Figure 10 shows a more static interpretation by using the O&P 
decomposition in logs (mixed) by groups of variables; in particular, panel B offers information on how 
is the actual and current situation of the investment climate and what is its effect on the aggregate TFP. 
From this panel we see that the effect of the infrastructures is negative in all the countries, implying 
this that the pro-productive factors never compensate the negative effects of the anti-competitive ones. 
The effect of the red tape, corruption and crime group in turkey is the largest and negative.  
It is interesting to study the relative weight of the different IC groups of variables in the relative 
contributions to the average demean log-productivity and to the demean efficiency term in logs. Thus, 
by forcing the contribution of the investment climate to the average productivity and to the allocative 
efficiency to be 100% we find that the relative contribution of the red tape, corruption and crime group 
in Turkey reaches 62%, in Mexico is 40% or in India 30%, as Figure 11, panel A shows. The same 
holds for the allocative efficiency where once again Turkey presents the largest contributions of the 
red tape corruption and crime group. 
The results of the percentage relative contributions are fully consistent with the managers’ 
perceptions presented in Figure 12. The red tape, corruption and crime group ranks first in terms of 




The lack of convergence in terms of per capita income with respect to the U.S and E.U during the 
last twenty-five years, reveals the striking weakness of the Turkish economy in terms of 
competitiveness. In particular, out of the total GDP gap between Turkey and European Union 
countries, 80% is explained by labor productivity. Comparing the decompositions of per capita income 
of Turkey with eastern European countries, we observe that Turkey is doing worse in term of the three 
elements; per capita GDP, labor productivity and labor force participation.  
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Large differences in output per worker between rich and poor countries are usually attributed to 
differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Thus, once Turkey has secured a reasonable level of 
macroeconomic stability, in order to get the objectives of increasing productivity and reduce 
unemployment, the main objective of Turkish’s economic authorities is seeking ways to stimulate 
country competitiveness and TFP is usually its main driver. 
In this paper we have extended the robust productivity (TFP) approach of Escribano and Guasch 
(2005, 2008) to alternative Olley and Pakes (1996) decompositions of TFP, logTFP and the mixed 
case. Each of them has certain advantages and disadvantage over the others. First, the O&P 
decomposition of TFP has the advantage that is the natural measure of productivity, measures linear 
and nonlinear relationships between TFP and IC variables, but has the draw back that it is difficult to 
get closed form relationships between TFP and IC and we have to obtain it by simulation methods. 
Second, the O&P decomposition in logs provides exact decompositions relating IC with logs TFP in 
terms of average productivity as well as with the allocative efficiency term. It also allows us to obtain 
an explicit decomposition relating the inputs (L, M and K) with the IC variables. It has the 
disadvantage, that they only provide approximate results since we are not interested in the IC effects 
on log TFP but on the effects on TFP. Finally, the mixed decompositions provide a nice compromise 
between the two. It gives us an explicit relationship between IC and Log TFP but also one in terms of 
efficiency. Furthermore, the allocative efficiency term is measured in terms of the share of sales and 
not the share of log sales, which is not invariant to changes on the units of measurements on sales. The 
empirical results in terms of the O&P are very similar to those in terms of the mixed TFP. However, 
with the O&P in logs the allocative efficiency effect on aggregate productivity is much lower in 
absolute terms. 
We have proposed to use a demean O&P decomposition for the evaluation of the IC effects by 
blocks and proposed to compare those proportions with the ones obtained from firm’s perception on 
bottlenecks for economic performance of firms. In fact, we obtain empirical results that are consistent 
with firm’s perceptions. The most important block of IC variable in Turkey is red tape, corruption and 
crime with the main individual IC constraints being; are taxes and tax administration and security. The 
second group of IC variables is infrastructures and the most important single elements within this 
block is the number of days to clear custom to import. Those results are also consistent with the ones 
obtained in term of ease of doing business of DBR (2007). 
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This new measure of TFP allows us to make interesting cross country comparisons. We found that 
Turkey has the lowest demean productivity level of the five countries considered (India, Mexico, 
Brazil and Chile). The explanation is simple the positive IC effects (like having e-mail, internet, 
internal training at the firms, etc.) dominates in all these countries, over the negative IC effects (losses 
due to power outages, managers time spent in bureaucratic issues, etc.) but the net effect is the 
smallest of the five countries. The corresponding ranking of countries in term of demean O&P 
decompositions are highly correlated with per-capita income rankings and with firm perceptions or the 
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Appendix I: Tables and Figures 
 
Table A.1:  General Information at Plant Level and Production Function Variables.1 
Industrial classification a) food and beverages; b) textiles and wearing 
apparel; c) chemical products, petroleum, coal, 
rubber and plastics; d) non-metallic metal 
products; e) fabricated metal products, excluding 
machinery and equipment; f) machinery and 
equipment, excluding electrical; g) electrical 
machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies; h) 
transport equipment.  
General Information 
at Plant Level 
Regional classification a) Marmara; b)  Ege; c) Ic Anadolu; d) Akdeniz; e) 
Karadeniz (Dogu Anadolu).  
Sales Used as the measure of output for the production 
function estimation. Sales are defined as total 
annual sales. The series are deflated by using the 
Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2000. 
Employment Total number of permanent and temporal 
workers.  
Total hours worked per year Total number of employees multiplied by the 
average hours worked per year. 
Materials Total costs of intermediate and raw materials 
used in production (excluding fuel). The series are 
deflated by using the Producer Price Indexes 
(PPI), base 2000. 
Capital stock Net book value of machinery and equipment. The 
series are deflated by using the Producer Price 
Indexes (PPI), base 2000. 
User cost of capital The user cost of capital is defined in terms of the 
opportunity cost of using capital; it is defined as a 




Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel. The series are 
deflated by using the Producer Price Indexes 
(PPI), base 2000. 
Exports Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are 
greater than 10%.  
Foreign Direct Investment Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of 
the capital of the firm is foreign. 
Wages Real wage is defined as the total expenditures on 
personnel (deflated by using the Producer Price 
Indexes (PPI), base 2000.) divided by the total 







Employment Total number of permanent and temporal 
workers.  













Table A.2 (I): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Days to clear customs for exports Average number of days to clear customs to export (log). 
Days to clear customs for imports  Average number of days to clear customs to imports (log). 
Average duration of power outages Average duration of power outages suffered by the plant in 
hours (log). 
Losses due to power outages Value of the losses due to the power outages as a percentage 
of sales (conditional on the plant reporting power outages). 
Number of power outages Number of power outages suffered by the plant in 2003 (log). 
Average duration of water outages Average duration of water outages suffered by the plant in 
hours (log). 
Number of water outages Number of water outages suffered by the plant in 2003 (log). 
Losses due to water outages Value of the losses due to the water outages as a percentage 
of sales (conditional on the plant reporting water outages). 
Wait for phone Actual delay to obtain a phone connection in days (log). 
Wait for electricity connection Actual delay to obtain a electricity connection in days (log). 
Wait for water connection Actual delay to obtain a water connection in days (log). 
Wait for health certification Actual delay to obtain a health certification in days (log). 
Shipment losses Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment 
that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft, spoilage or other 
deficiencies of the transport means used. 
Dummy for email Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses email.   
Dummy for internet page Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a website.  
Infrastructures 
Dummy for electronic invoice 
system 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses an 




















Table A.2 (II): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for criminal activity Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant suffered 
any criminal attempt during 2003. 
Losses due to criminal activity Value of losses due to criminal activity (log). 
Security expenses Cost in security (equipment, staff, etc) (log). 
Illegal payments for protection Cost due to protection payments e. g. to organized 
crime to prevent violence (bribery) (log). 
Dummy for consulting  Dummy variable that takes value 1if the firm uses 
consultants or employments to help deal with 
bureaucratic issues. 
Dummy for payments to deal with 
bureaucratic issues 
Dummy that takes value 1 if firms in the main sector 
occasionally need to give gifts or make informal 
payments to  public officers in order to “get things done” 
with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, legislations, 
services, etc. 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic 
issues 
Percentage of managers' time spent in dealing with 
bureaucratic issues. 
Dummy for informal competition Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm competes 
with informal (no registered) firms. 
Sales declared to taxes Percentage of total sales declared to taxes. 
Labor costs declared Percentage of workforce declared to taxes. 
Number of inspections In the last year, total number of inspections (log). 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract 
with the government 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if in plant's sector it 
is common to pay an extra amount of money in order to 
obtain a contract with the government. 
Conflicts with clients Percentage of conflicts with clients solved in the courts 
in the last two years. 
Average duration of conflicts Average weeks that take to resolve a conflict from the 
moment the case was brought to court until the moment 
the court decided the case. 
Absenteeism Days of production lost due to absenteeism (log). 
Wait for a construction related permit Actual delay to obtain a construction related in days 
(log). 
Wait for a main operating license Actual delay to obtain a main operating license in days 
(log). 
Dummy for new land or building Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm acquired 
or attempted to acquire new land or buildings to expand 
operations in the previous 3 years. 
Delay to obtain a land or a building Total time that took from the moment the firm decided 
to buy a new land or building to the moment the firm 
finally got it (Including all the time required for official 
registration, negotiations with the seller and obtaining 
all licenses and necessary development permits and 
excluding the time needed for the construction permits).  
Transaction fees to obtain a land or a 
building 
Total cost related with transaction fees (including 
registration fees, payments to lawyers, brokers, etc) to 
obtain a land or a building.  
Payment to government or private parties 
to obtain a land or a building 
Total cost in informal payments to government officials 
or private parties to obtain a new land or buildings 
Dummy for contract enforcement Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the conflict of the 
firm with clients solved in courts were generally 
enforced. 
Dummy for alternative resolution of 
conflicts 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm attempted 
to use alternative ways of resolution of conflicts with 
clients (e.g. arbitration or mediation). 
Dummy for lawsuit Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has been 
involved in a lawsuit in the last three years. 
Delayed payments Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers 




Sales never repaid Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers 




Table A.2 (III): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for credit line Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports 
that it has a credit line. 
Dummy for loan Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports 
that it has a bank loan. 
Dummy for loan outstanding Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan outstanding from a financial institution. 
Dummy for loan bank Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan from a domestic private commercial banks. 
Dummy for loan leasing Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan from a leasing arrangement. 
Dummy for loan public Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan from a state owned banks. 
Dummy for loan informal Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan from Informal sources (e.g. money lender). 
Dummy for loan DOT Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a 
loan from the Small and Medium Sized Industry 
Development Organization of Turkey (Incentive Credit 
for Export)  
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is 
denominated in Turkish Lira. 
Dummy for loan foreign currency Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is 
denominated in a foreign currency. 
Dummy for loan with collateral Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is on 
collateral. 
Dummy for loan long term Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the duration of 
the loan is more than 12 months. 
Borrows foreign Percentage of borrows denominated in foreign 
currency. 
Dummy for rent land Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant rents 
almost all its lands. 
Dummy for rent buildings Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant rents 































Table A.2 (IV): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for quality certification Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a quality 
certification. 
Dummy for new product Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has developed 
a new product or product line. 
Dummy for product upgraded Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant upgraded an 
existing product last year. 
Dummy for new technology 
purchased 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm purchased any 
new technology during last year. 
Dummy for licensed technology Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm used a licensed 
technology of a foreign company in the last year. 
Dummy for education of the 
manager 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the manager of the 
plant has a bachelor or higher education degree. 
Conflicts with employees Times in the last year the firm was taken to court by its 
current and former employees 
Duration of conflicts with 
employees 
Average weeks that take to resolve a conflict with an 
employee from the moment the case was brought to court 
until the moment the court decided the case. 
Staff-skilled workers Percentage of skilled workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-unskilled workers Percentage of unskilled workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-professional workers Percentage of professional workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-part time workers Percentage of part time workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-female workers Percentage of female workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-temporal workers Percentage of temporal workers in firm's staff. 
Dummy for internal training Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant provides 
internal training to its employees. 
Dummy for external training Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant provides 
external training to its employees. 
Training skilled workers  Percentage of skilled workers that received training during 
last year.  
Training unskilled workers  Percentage of unskilled workers that received training during 
last year. 
Weeks of training of skilled workers Number of weeks of training received by the skilled workers 
during last year. 
Weeks of training of unskilled 
workers 
Number of weeks of training received by the unskilled 
workers during last year. 
Staff-university  Percentage of staff with at least one year of university. 
Staff-middle education Percentage of staff with completed high school (11 years) or 




















Table A.2 (V): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for incorporated company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is an 
incorporated company. 
Dummy for public Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
government. 
Dummy for foreign direct 
investment 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of the capital 
of the firm is foreign. 
Age of the firm Difference between the year that the plant started operations 
and current year. 
Number of competitors Number of competitors in the main market (log). 
Dummy for exporter Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are greater 
than 10%.  
Dummy for importer Dummy variable that takes value 1 if imports are greater 
than 10%.  
Percentage of capacity utilization Average percentage of capacity used during last year. 
Dummy for holding company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to a 
holding company. 
Market share Market share of the firm (percentage). 
Competitive pressure Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the number of 
competitors in firm's main market has increased during last 
year. 
Percentage of workforce unionized Percentage of workers that belongs to a syndicate. 
Strikes Days of production lost due to strikes (log). 
Dummy for ownership Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm previously 
belonged to the government. 
Dummy for industrial zone Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is located in an 
industrial zone. 
Dummy for foreign competition Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm competes with 
foreign firms. 
Small Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs 49 
workers or less. 
Medium Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs more 
than 49 workers and less or equal than 249. 
Large Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs 250 
workers or more. 


















Table B.1: Correlation matrix among productivity measures  
  
Two steps Single step Restricted Single step Unrestricted 
  
Solow’s Residual Cobb Douglas Translog Cobb Douglas Translog 
  
Restr. Unrestr. OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
Restricted Solow's 
residual 1          
Unrestricted 
Solow's residual 0.993 1         
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.926 0.918 1        
Cobb Douglas RE 0.923 0.915 0.999 1       
Translog OLS 0.915 0.908 0.993 0.993 1      
Translog RE 0.911 0.905 0.993 0.994 0.999 1     
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.596 0.611 0.637 0.638 0.639 0.638 1    
Cobb Douglas RE 0.591 0.609 0.633 0.634 0.635 0.635 0.99 1   
Translog OLS 0.046 0.007 0.052 0.049 0.044 0.043 -0.07 -0.089 1  
Translog RE -0.001 -0.043 -0.008 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.127 -0.127 0.968 1 
Notes: 
a)  Solow residuals in logs are obtained as sales (in logarithms or logs) minus a weighted sum of labor, materials, capital (all in logs) 
where the weights are given by the share in total costs of each of the inputs.  
(1)    Restricted case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages of the plant-level cost shares across the entire sample.  
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages across plant-level cost shares for each of the eight 
industries. 
(3)    Outlier plants were defined as those which had ratios of materials to sales larger than one or had ratios of labor costs to sales 
larger than one. 
b)  Estimated Productivities in logs are obtained from Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions of sales with inputs labor, 
materials, and capital estimated by OLS and by random effects under two different environments: 
(1)    Restricted: a single set of production function coefficients is obtained using data on plants, for all industries (excluding outliers). 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry: a set of production function coefficients is obtained for each one of eight industries using data on all 
















Table C.1a: ICA elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity, restricted 
estimation. 
  Two steps 
estimation 
Single step estimation 
  Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
Blocks of ICA 







Days to clear customs to imports 
(a) -0.171*** -0.171** -0.199*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.202*** 
Average duration of power 
outages (a) -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.323*** -0.318*** -0.286*** -0.293*** 
Delay to obtain a phone 
connection (a) -0.005** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.074 0.074 0.160*** 0.166** 0.129** 0.134** 
Losses due to criminal activity (a) -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.080*** 
Manager's time spent in bur. 
issues (a) -0.021*** -0.021** -0.016** -0.016* -0.016** -0.016* 
Illegal payments for protection -0.254*** -0.254** -0.205** -0.216** -0.229*** -0.238** 
Sales declared to taxes (a) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009** 
Number of inspections -0.032 -0.032 -0.027 -0.026 -0.028 -0.026 
Absenteeism (a) -0.271** -0.271* -0.297** -0.297** -0.303** -0.292** 








Dummy for external auditory (a) 0.769* 0.769** 1.008*** 0.992*** 0.800** 0.842** 
Dummy for new technology 
purchased (a) 0.187 0.187 0.256 0.26 0.295 0.318 
Staff-unskilled workers -0.182** -0.182** -0.087 -0.079 -0.086 -0.081 





Weeks of training of skilled 
workers (a) 0.041*** 0.041** 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.016 
Age of the firm -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Dummy for ownership 0.344** 0.344 0.447*** 0.445* 0.453*** 0.472** 
Dummy for small firms -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.769*** -0.817*** -0.875*** -0.933*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for medium -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.435*** -0.467*** -0.546*** -0.585*** 
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 
  R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 
Notes. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant changes are in Dummy for external audit and Weeks of training 
of skilled workers, both variables are significant at 15% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 













Table C.1b: ICA elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity, unrestricted 
estimation. 
  Two steps estimation Single step estimation 
  Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
Blocks of ICA 







Days to clear customs to 
imports (a) -0.152** -0.152** -0.151** -0.154** -0.141** -0.136* 
Average duration of power 
outages (a) -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.268*** -0.255*** -0.170* -0.159* 
Delay to obtain a phone 
connection (a) -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.061 0.061 0.144** 0.151** 0.130** 0.141** 
Losses due to criminal 
activity (a) -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.068*** 
Manager's time spent in bur. 
issues (a) -0.020*** -0.020** -0.021*** -0.020** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
Illegal payments for 
protection -0.267*** -0.267** -0.166* -0.165 -0.195** -0.208** 
Sales declared to taxes (a) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.006* 0.006* 
Number of inspections -0.036* -0.036 -0.036* -0.036 -0.022 -0.024 
Absenteeism (a) -0.260** -0.260* -0.241** -0.254* -0.271** -0.293** 




Dummy for informal 




Dummy for external auditory 
(a) 0.717* 0.717** 0.695* 0.669** 0.514 0.557* 
Dummy for new technology 
purchased (a) 0.241 0.241 0.212 0.203 0.526** 0.514** 
Staff-unskilled workers -0.167** -0.167** -0.086 -0.087 -0.044 -0.038 





Weeks of training of skilled 
workers (a) 0.043*** 0.043** 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.003 
Age of the firm -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Dummy for ownership 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 
Dummy for small firms -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.622*** -0.660*** -0.442*** -0.477*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for medium -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.376*** -0.397*** -0.148 -0.182* 
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 
  R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.803 0.803 0.845 0.845 
Notes. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant changes are in Dummy for external audit and Weeks of training 
of skilled workers, both variables are significant at 15% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 










Table C.2a: Percentage Contribution of IC and C Variables to the Mixed Olley and Pakes 
Decomposition of the Productivity; Restricted Solow Residual. 
  






Days to clear customs to imports -12.29 -12.2 -0.09 
Average duration of power outages -2.97 -3.38 0.4 
Delay to obtain a phone connection 2.76 2.51 0.26 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail -2.38 -2.04 -0.33 
Losses due to criminal activity -35.4 -35.16 -0.23 
Manager's time spent in bur. issues -2.64 -2.92 0.27 
Illegal payments for protection -7.77 -7.95 0.18 
Sales declared to taxes 28.34 29.22 -0.88 
Number of inspections -1.55 -1.35 -0.2 
Absenteeism -3.16 -3.57 0.41 








Dummy for external auditory -1.99 -2.05 0.05 
Dummy for new technology purchased 14.16 12.8 1.36 
Staff-unskilled workers 3.44 3.44 0 




Weeks of training of skilled workers -0.79 -0.47 -0.31 
Age of the firm 5.18 5.46 -0.28 
Dummy for ownership -0.13 -0.14 0.01 
Dummy for small firms -1.03 -4.87 3.84 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for medium -5.17 -4.61 -0.56 
Year Dummies 
Year 2004 0.96 1.15 -0.19 
Textiles and Apparels 0.32 0.36 -0.04 
Chemicals 7.09 5.25 1.84 
Non Metallic Mineral Products 0.2 0.13 0.07 
Metal Products (excl. M&E) 0.63 0.73 -0.1 
Machinery and Equipment -0.66 -1.3 0.64 
Electrical Machinery -0.1 -0.15 0.06 
Industry 
Dummies 
Transport Equipment -0.26 -0.35 0.09 
Constant 108.01 108.01 0 
Residual 13.74 0 13.74 
  
Total 100 80.98 19.02 
NOTES: 
* Results presented are relative to aggregate productivity (in logs). 
** The productivity measure used to construct the tables is the restricted Solow residual. 





Table C.2b: IC impact on the inputs of the production function: Evaluation based on 
the Olley and Pakes decomposition in logs  (with log TFP and the shares of log sales). 
  









Days to clear customs to imports -0.25 -0.59 -0.02 0.43 -0.43 
Average duration of power outages -0.96 -0.22 0.1 1.52 0.45 
Delay to obtain a phone connection 0.82 1.23 0.09 0.26 2.39 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail -0.24 -1.14 -0.13 1.36 -0.14 
Losses due to criminal activity -0.44 0.57 -0.06 -1.59 -1.52 
Manager's time spent in bur. issues 0.21 -0.37 0.1 0.63 0.57 
Illegal payments for protection 0.22 -0.77 0.09 1.81 1.34 
Sales declared to taxes -2.06 -2.36 -0.05 -3.15 -7.63 
Number of inspections -0.19 -0.52 -0.07 0.42 -0.36 
Absenteeism 0.05 0.49 0.03 1.49 2.05 




Dummy for informal competition 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.1 0.1 
Finance and 
corporate 
governance Dummy for external auditory 0.18 0.24 0.01 0.69 1.12 
Dummy for new technology 
purchased 2.66 4.19 0.09 2.34 9.28 
Staff-unskilled workers -0.14 0.01 0.03 -0.2 -0.29 





Weeks of training of skilled workers -0.81 -1.42 -0.07 0.83 -1.48 
Age of the firm -0.09 -1.99 -0.32 1.45 -0.94 
Dummy for ownership -0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.1 
Dummy for small firms 0.23 0.59 0.06 0.18 1.05 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for medium 8.15 13.09 0.96 0.78 22.97 
Year Dummies 
Year 2004 -4.62 -10.21 -0.47 0.92 -14.38 
Textiles and Apparels 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 
Chemicals 4.86 2.58 0.01 8.3 15.75 
Non Metallic Mineral Products -0.03 0.11 0 -0.04 0.05 
Metal Products (excl. M&E) -0.32 -1.88 0.02 -0.19 -2.37 
Machinery and Equipment 0.44 0.11 0.1 2.55 3.2 
Electrical Machinery 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.17 
Industry 
Dummies 
Transport Equipment 0.11 0.09 -0.01 0.15 0.35 
Constant -0.61 -1.32 -0.04 1.38 -0.59 
Residual -5.22 -29.3 -1.39 110.89 74.99 
  
Total -0.41 -33.68 -1.34 135.43 100 
NOTES: 
* Results presented are relative to aggregate productivity (in logs). 
** The productivity measure used to construct the tables is the restricted Solow residual. 




Figure 1: Decomposition of Turkish GDP per capita with respect to U.S and U.E (15) 
 
Notes: 
a) European Union includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy,  Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Portugal.   
b) Per capita income (Y/P) is decomposed into labor productivity (Y/L) and the employment-population rate (L/P) by 
following the next expression: (Y/P)= (Y/L)*(L/P); relative to the United States the expression becomes: (YUS/PUS)]= 
[(YTUR/LTUR)/ (YUS/LUS)]*[(LTUR/PTUR)/ (LUS/PUS)] 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.   
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Olley and Pakes Decomposition in Levels by Size and Age of Aggregate 
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Mixed Olley and Pakes Decomposition by Size and Age of Aggregate 
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Relative ICA effects by groups of variables on aggregate productivity, average productivity 
and efficiency (covariance term) (mixed decomposition and simulations of a 20% 







A B A B A B
Infrastructures Red tape, corruption and crime
Finance and corporate governance Quality, innovation and labor skils
Other control variables
A: Percentage Contribution of IC and C Variables to the Olley and Pakes Decomposition of the Aggregate 
Productivity in Logs.
B: Simulations of a Change in ICA Vars and % Change on Aggregate Producivity and on the Components of 
the Olley and Pakes Decomposition.
Aggregate Productivity Average Productivity Efficiency
 
 
Aggregate Productivity Average Productivity Efficiency Term 
 A B A B A B 
Infrastructures 15.35 16.86 15.42 17.53 14.62 18.90 
Red Tape, Corruption and Crime 63.75 65.92 64.96 66.16 48.18 58.18 
Finance and Corporate Governance 10.65 9.48 9.81 8.49 18.32 15.29 
Quality, Innovation and Labour Skills 9.61 7.66 9.58 7.75 11.14 7.56 
Other Control Variables 0.64 0.07 0.23 0.07 7.74 0.07 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: 
A: relative contributions computed according to equations (3.4). 
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Firm’s perceptions; percentage of firms that considers each one of the following 
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1.2 Electricity  
1.3 Transportation 
1.4 Customs and trade regulations 
 
2 Red tape, corruption and crime. 
2.1 Business Licensing and Operating 
Permits 
2.2 Tax Rates 
2.3 Tax Administration 
 
2.4 Corruption 
2.5 Crime, theft and disorder 
2.6 Anti-competitive or Informal 
Practices 
2.7 Legal system/ Conflict Resolution  
 
3. Finance. 
3.1 Access to Land 
3.2 Access to Finance 
3.3 Cost of Finance 
3.4 Macroeconomic uncertainty 
4. Labor skills. 
4.1 Labor Regulations 
4.2 Skills and Education of Available 
Workforce 
 
5. Total relative weights. 
6. Average group relative weights. 
* (Totals are computed as the relative weigh 
of each group of perceptions over the sum 




Figure 7a: Evolution of GDP per capita in Turkey and selected comparator countries, 1990-2004 
 
Figure 7b: Evolution of GDP per worker in Turkey and selected comparator countries, 1990-2004 
 
















































Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at 





















































































Figure 8: Comparison of Turkey’s performance with 4 selected economies according to 






























Ranking out of 178 economies, in parentheses is the ranking within the sample of five economies included in the figure. 
Highlighted in red are the factors for which Turkey is below the middle of the ranking, says 89 out of 178. 
Source: Doing Business Report 2007, World Bank, Washington D.C. 


























Chile 28 (1) 33 (1) 59 (2) 67 (1) 32 (2) 45 (1) 32 (1) 34 (1) 35 (1) 63 (1) 98 (2)
Mexico 41 (2) 62 (3) 20 (1) 134 (4) 79 (3) 45 (1) 32 (1) 140 (4) 69 (2) 79 (2) 23 (1)
Turkey 65 (3) 40 (2) 126 (4) 138 (5) 30 (1) 62 (3) 62 (5) 85 (2) 73 (4) 36 (4) 114 (3)
Brazil 113 (4) 120 (5) 95 (3) 116 (3) 109 (5) 80 (5) 62 (5) 139 (3) 70 (3) 112 (3) 136 (5)
India 132 (5) 93 (4) 133 (5) 83 (2) 108 (4) 62 (4) 32 (3) 158 (5) 142 (5) 177 (5) 135 (4)
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Figure 9: Comparing Turkey’s IC effects on the O&P decomposition with selected 
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B. Percentage increment in average productivity from a 20% improvement in IC 
variables 
C. Percentage increment in allocative efficiency from a 20% improvement in IC 
variables 
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Figure 10: Comparing Turkey’s IC effects on the O&P decomposition with selected 
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B. Average productivity gains and losses from the investment climate conditions 
C. Average allocative efficiency gains and losses from the investment climate 
conditions 
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A. Percentage absolute contribution on average productivity 
B. Percentage absolute contribution on allocative efficiency 
Source: Authors’ calculations with World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment data.   
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